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NOTES
The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or
Due Protection?
In Vlandis v. Kline1 and United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 2 decided during its past term, the Supreme Court invoked the conclusive presumption doctrine to invalidate statutory
provisions,that restricted access to certain state and federal government benefits.3 This term, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,4 the Court used the same rationale to strike down school
board rules requiring teachers to take maternity leaves without pay.6
The essence of the doctrine is as follows: When a statutory provision
imposes a burden upon a class of individuals for a particular purpose and certain individuals within the burdened class are so situated that burdening them does not further that purpose, then the
rigid statutory classification must be replaced, to the extent administratively feasible, by an individual factual determination that more
accurately selects the individuals who are to bear the statutory burden. The legislature in such cases is said to have "conclusively presumed" that all members of the burdened class possess t)lose characteristics that caused the burden to be imposed, and due process is
found to require an individual opportunity to rebut this presumption. The relatively few cases in which the Court applied this doctrine before last term involved such burdens as deprivation of property through estate6 or income7 taxation, denial of the right to vote,8
removal of children from their unmarried father's custody,0 and
1. 412 U.S. 441 (1973), affg. 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge court),
2. 413 U.S. 508 (1973),
3. In Vlandis, the benefit involved was a state subsidy of higher education for residents; in Murry, it was the provision of food stamps for needy households.
4. 42 U.SL.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974).
5. The Supreme Court may have another opportunity to expand or explain the
conclusive presumption doctrine in Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362
(U.S., Dec. 11, 1973) (No. 73-640), which involves a California statute that exempts pregnancy-related work loss from coverage under the state's disability insurance program
until 28 days after termination of pregnancy. The three-judge district court used the
so-called "means scrutiny" test, described in the text accompanying notes 97.99 infra,
and concluded that the statute violated the equal protection clause. The issues involved
in the case appear to be quite similar to those in LaFleur.
6. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 280
(1926).
7. Hoeper v. Tax Commn., 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
8. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (use of conclusive presumption doctrine
under equal protection clause).
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), See Comment, The Emerging Constitu•
tional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 l\fICH, L. REv. 1581 (1972),
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suspension of a driver's license.10 This Note examines equal protection alternatives to the conclusive presumption doctrine that were
apparently rejected by the Court; analyzes the doctrine itself in
terms of constitutional language, judicial precedents, theoretical
soundness, and practical workability; and concludes with a suggested
equal protection standard that would serve the purposes of the doctrine while avoiding many of its difficulties.
Vlandis involved a Connecticut statute that imposed a higher
tuition rate on nonresidents attending state institutions of higher
education th~n on residents.11 Single students were defined as nonresidents if their legal addresses were outside of Connecticut at any
time during the one-year period immediately preceding application
for admission,12 while married students were classified as nonresidents if their legal addresses were outside the state at the time
of application.13 Once established, a student's residency status could
not be changed during the period of his attendance at the Connecticut institution.14
Since even the higher nonresident tuition did not fully defray
the cost of a higher education, all students received some degree of
state subsidy,16 but residents were given a greater subsidy on the
"assumption that the resident or his parents have supported the
State in the past' and will continue to do so in the future." 16 The
legislative purpose behind the tuition differential was thus to favor
those who were likely to have made or to make a contribution to
the state fisc, while requiring students who were in Connecticut only
for the benefit of a higher education to pay a greater portion of
their mm way.
The student's address at the date of application17 was adopted as
a convenient rule-of-thumb, permitting easy administration by·avoiding a more detailed inquiry into the personal circumstances of each
student. Since application for admission is typically made several
months in advance of the school semester, and since nonresident
10. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-119a (Supp. 1973) (University of Connecticut). See
also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-116 (state colleges), 10-IOSc (state technical colleges),
10-38h (regional community colleges) (Supp. 1973). Nonresidency was statutorily defined.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-329b(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1973). Beginning with the spring semester of 1972, nonresident students at the University of Connecticut were required to pay
425 dollars for tuition in addition to a 200-dollar nonresident fee, while resident students were required to pay only 175 dollars for tuition. 412 U.S. at 444.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(3) (Supp. 1973).
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(5) (Supp. 1973).
15. Brief for Appellant at 11.
16. Id.
17. The difference in the definition as applied to single and married students will
be ignored for the purposes of this Note since it was of no significance in the case.
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students are unlikely to have established a Connecticut address at
that early date, the statutory definition appeared to be a reasonably
accurate means of separating nonresidents from residents. Residency
status was made unchangeable to avoid difficulties of proofA since
it seemed difficult to establish a genuine change in residency among
"college students who seldom. have set plans for their future
homes."18
The plaintiffs in Vlandis were students at the University of
Connecticut who had applied for admission from outside the state
but who had acquired such contacts with the state as a permanent
home (plaintiff Kline), a driver's license, car registration, and voter
registration. Claiming to be bona fide Connecticut residents, they
sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statutory
definition of nonresident was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The plaintiffs' equal protection argument urged alternatively that
there was an impingement on their right to travel10 or, in any
case, that the classifications created by the statute were not rationally
related to its goals.20 Their due process claim rested upon the conclusive presumption doctrine: The plaintiffs argued that their right
to procedural due process was violated since the statute permanently
and irreversibly classified them as nonresidents.21
The three-judge district court did not consider the plaintiffs' due
process and equal protection claims separately, relying upon Bolling
v. Sharpe22 for the proposition that the standard in the instant case
would be the same under either clause.23 The court found the Conne~ticut statute "arbitrary and unreasonable" on its face and therefore did not reach the right-to-travel argument. 24 With regard to
18. Brief for Appellant at 15. See also 412 U.S. at 451.
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). For ex•
amples of recent applications of tbe rational relation standard witb less judicial defer•
ence, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972),
See generally Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection,
72 MICH. L REv. 508 (1974),
21. Botb tbe district court and the Supreme Court state tbat tbe plaintiffs argued a
violation of tbe due process clause. See 412 U.S. at 444; 346 F. Supp. at 527, The plain•
tiffs' complaints actually do not mention tbe due process clause. See Appendix at 4a•5a,
13a•14a.
22. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
23, 346 F. Supp. at 528. The district court's reasoning in this regard seems open to
dispute, since Bolling merely established tbat tbe fiftb amendment due process clause
and tbe fourteentb amendment equal protection clause are "not mutually exclusive,"
347 U.S. at 499, and tbat equal protection requirements can tbus be applied to the
federal government by way of tbe fifth amendment. This does not imply that the
fourteentb amendment equal protection and due process standards are identical. 347
U.S. at 499. The use of tbe fourteentb amendment due process clause to deal with
equal protection probJems would make the equal protection clause superfluous.
24. 346 F. Supp. at 529 n.4.
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the conclusive presumption argument, the court ruled that ''the state
may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do not belong
in that class."25 Finding the plaintiffs to be bona fide Connecticut
residents, the distric;t court concluded that the statute violated the
fourteenth amendment. The court entered a permanent injunction
against further enforcement of the statute and ordered a partial
tuition refund to plaintiffs for the spring semester of 1972.
On appeal, the Supreme Court ;;tffiu:ned. Justice Stewart's opinion wholly ignored plaintiffs' equal protection arguments, although
equal protection was clearly the focus of both parties' briefs26 and
oral arguments.27 Rather, the Court decided the case on the sole
ground of the conclusive presumption doctrine, formulating the
standard as follows:
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned ·with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to (ieny an individual
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresiclence, when that presumption is not necessarily
or universally true in fact, and when the State l!as rea&on~ble alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, ~tandards
of due process require that the State allow such an individual the
opportunity to present evidence showing t;Jiat he is a bona fi.de resident entitled to the in-state rates.28

United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,29 handed
down two weeks after Vlandis, involved an amendment:3° to the Food
Stamp Act of l964;,81 The over-all legislative objective behind the
food-stamp program was "to safeguard the health and well-being of
the Nation's population and· raise levels of nutrition among lowincome households." 82 By 1970, Congress had become concerned that
25. 346 F. Supp. at 528, citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (19$2).
26. Connecticut's brief dealt solely with equal protection arguments. P~aintiffs' brief
devoted only 11 of 59 pages to due process; the remainqer c;oncentrated on equal protection.
27. Letter from John A. Dziamba, counsel for plaintiffs, to Michigan Law Review,
Sept. 13, 1973, at 3.
28. 412 U.S. at 452.
29. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
1
30. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 9H571, § 4, 84 Stat. 2049 (coclified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2014(b) (1970)).
31. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat, 703 (codified ~t 7 U.S.Q, §§ 2()11-25 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972)).
32, 7 u.s.c. § 2011 (1970). T~e federal food-stamp pro~ is administered by the
states in connection with other federally aided public assistance programs. 7 U.S,C.
§ 2013 (1970). The Act requires the states to follow "uniform national standards of
eligibility" established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2014 (b) (1970), that are designed to take account of income and other financial resources available to recipient households in order to limit the benefits of the program
"to those households whose income and other financial resources are determined to

-
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the food-stamp program was being abused by the nonneedy,83 in
particular by "college students, children of wealthy parents."34 Complaints from constituents had led at least some Congressmen to speculate that, if such abuses were not checked, public pressure might ultimately lead to the destruction of the entire program.80 The
congressional response to this pressure was the following amendment:
Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent cltlld for Federal
income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp
program established pursuant to this chapter during the ta." period
such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax period.3 6

Since the tax exemption is generally available only if the taxpayer provides over half of the dependent child's support,37 the
draftsmen apparently thought it likely that households that included
such dependents would have an independent source of income and
thus be unlikely to need food stamps. While that is probably true
as a general rule, the plaintiffs in Murry came from needy households that were precluded from food-stamp relief by the operation
of the amendment. They were represented by welfare rights advocates of the New York-based Food Research and Action Center, who
were aware that the plaintiffs presented the most sympathetic fact
situations for a test case challenge of the amendment.38
be substantial limiting factors in permitting them to purchase a nutritionally ade•
quate diet." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1970). In practical operation, the recipient houscl1old
typically obtains certification from its local welfare agency after a determination of
the household's eligibility in a caseworker interview. Coupons with a face value con•
sidered sufficient to purchase a "nutritionally adequate diet," 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970),
are then purchased by the recipient, usually at a local bank, at a rate adjusted accord•
ing to the household's need. The payment schedule is designed to require a "reasonable
investment," in no case more than 80 per cent of its income, from the household, 7
U.S.C. § 2016(b) (1970). Coupons thus obtained may be exchanged at government•
approved retail stores for any domestic food (but not liquor or tobacco) at prevailing
market prices. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b) (1970).

,

33. "The most serious criticisms of the present program have been directed toward
misuse of food stamps." [1970] 3 U.S. CoDE CONG. & .ADMIN. NEWS 6048 (Representative
Catherine May). See also 116 CONG. R.Ec. 41979 (1970) (remarks of Representative Latta)
("Every Member has been back home often this year and has heard the many, many
complaints on the misuse of this program •..• I, for one, do not wish to see these
complaints multiplying year after year and threatening the existence of the program for
those genuinely in need.').
84. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 41979 (1970) (remarks of Representative Latta),
85. Id. See also 116 CoNG. Ric. 41982 (remarks of Representative Poage), 41983 (re•
marks of Representative Hutchinson), 42021 (remarks of Representative Belcher) (1970),
86. 7 u.s.c. § 2014(b) (1970).
87. INTERNAL REvENUE CODE OF 1954, § 152(a).
88. Letter from Ronald F. Pollack, attorney for plaintiffs, to Michigan Law Review,
March 7, 1974.
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Of the eight plaintiffs chosen to represent the class of households
adversely affected by the provision, Mrs. Murry may be regarded
as typical. Her household included herself, her two sons, one of
whom was nineteen, and her two grandchildren. The household's
sole source of income consisted of court-ordered child support payments of $57.50 per month from her ex-husband. When he claimed
the two sons and one grandson as dependents in his income-tax return, Mrs. Murry's household was denied food stamps.
A class action was brought in federal district court to enjoin
enforcement of the provision as a violation of plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights to due process and equal protection.39 The three-judge
panel granted the relief requested, stating that
the Amendment wholly missed its target. By creating an irrebuttable
presumption contrary to fact, the Amendment classifies households
arbitrarily along lines that have no rational relationship to the
statutory scheme or the Amendment's apparent purpose. It creates
a classification which denies similar treatment to all persons similarly ·
situated and is, on its face and by its operation as established in this
record, grossly unfair. Thus, there is both a denial of due process
and of equal protection.40
In an opinion ·written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court
affirmed. As in Vlandis, primary attention in the briefs was devoted
to equal protection arguments,41 yet again the equal protection claim
was ignored in the Court's opinion. The Court found that the provision created "a conclusive presumption that the 'tax dependent's'
household is not needy and has access to nutritional adequacy." 42
It concluded "that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent
in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different
household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives
and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It
therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process . . . _.'' 43 Although Justice Douglas had joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Vlandis, 44 he cited that case as precedent for the doctrine applied in
Murry.45
39. An equal protection component was read into the fifth amendment in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642
(1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
40. Murry v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 348 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. The government devoted a single footnote to the due process argument in its
main brief, Brief for Appellants at 7 n.4, and less than 3 pages in its reply brief. Reply
Brief for Appellants at 10-12. Appellees used only 15 out of 50 pages in the argument
section of their brief for the due process claim. Brief for Appellees at 57-72.
42. 413 U.S. at 511.
43. 413 U.S. at 513.
44. 412 U.S. at 463.
45. 413 U.S. at 513. Although Justice Douglas did not look at the purpose of the
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Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur4 6 involved a rule,
adopted by the Cleveland Board of Education, that imposed mandatory, unpaid maternity leaves upon pregnant school teachers for a
period beginning five months before the child's expected birth and
extending until the next regular school semester after the child
reached the age of three months. While testimony from the rule's
original draftsmen suggested that its purpose was to prevent embarrassment to pregnant teachers and to avoid classroom disruption
caused by giggling schoolchildren,41 the school board attempted to
justify the rule as "an orderly and efficient procedure to maintain
an adequate continuity of able-bodied classroom teachers." 48 Since
most pregnant teachers would have to leave school at some stage in
their pregnancy, and since women in the late stages of pregnancy
were believed unable adequately to perform teaching duties,40 the
five-month cut-off date was argued to fulfill "the administrative need
for a uniform rule" and to clfford adequate notice to allow the school
to obtain a substitute teacher. 60
The plaintiffs in LaFleur were not due to give birth until midsummer and desired to continue teaching through the end of the
school year. When they were, nonetheless, required to take unpaid
mciternity leave beginning in Marc;h, they challenged the rule in
federal distrjct ~ourt as a violatiop. of equal protection. The ·supreme Coµrt found the school board rule unconstitutional. Although the case had been argued and decided purely on equal protectio11 grounds in both lower courts51 and had been treated by all
statute, Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, noted that "alleviating hunger and mal•
nutrition among the needy" was one of the statute's purposes. 413 U.S. at 514. Justice
Stewart then concluded that Vl1mdis applied and that the plaintiffs should bave been
given the opportunity to show that they 1vere, in fact, needy. 413 U.S. at 516•17, He also
noted that "alternative means" were available to Congress for achieving its desire to
restrict abuse of the food stamp program. 413 U.S. at 517 n.2.
46. 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974). LaFleur was a consolidation of two cases,
the second involving a similar rule adopted by the school board of Chesterfield County,
Virginia. Since the facts of the two cases were essentially similar, only LaFleur will be
discussed in this Note.
47. Appendix at 173a (Deposition of Dr. Mark C. Schinnerer, April 13, 1971). See
also 42 u.s.r..w. at 4189 n.9.
48. Brief for Petitioners at 19.
49. Id. at 7-11.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Finding that "there is a reasonable basis for the rule which distinguishes preg·
nant teachers from all other teachers," LaFleur v, Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F, Supp,
1208, 1214 (N.D. Ohio 1971), the district court held that "the plaintiffs' burden of
showing that the maternity ll'!ave of absence is arbitrary and unreasonable," 326 F,
Supp. at 1214, had not been carried. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding a violation of
the plaintiffs' right to equ_al protection: "This record indicates ckarly that pregnant
women teachers have been singled out for unconstitutionally unequal restrictions upon
their employment." LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir.
1972).
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parties as an equal protection case in briefs~2 and oral argument513 at
the Supreme Court level, Justice Stewart's majority opinion rested
the decision squarely upon the due process conclusive presumption
doctrine:uio
Even assuming arguendo that there are some women who would be
physically unable to work past the particular cut-off dates embodied
in the challenged rules, it is evident that there are large numbers of
teachers who are fully capable of continuing work £or longer than
the . . . regulations will allow. Thus, the conclusive presumption
embodied in these rules, like that in Vlandis, is neither "necessarily
nor universally true," and is violative of the Dµe :Process Clause.55

Vlandis and Murry both involved statutes with the over-all purpose of distributing government largesse among a class of beneficiaries possessing certain characteristics. Both cases also h1volved
statutory provisions designed to restrict the receipt of benefits to the
intended class. The draftsmen sought to do this by defining, in a
manner that could be easily administered, a class of individuals who
were thought unlikely to possess the characteristics of the intended
recipients. Thus, in Vlandis, those who applied for admission from
ou~ide the state were considered unlikely to be residents and unlikely to become residents during their attendance at the university.
In Murry, tax-dependent household& were believed unlikely to lack,
financial :,;esources sufficient to purchase an adequate diet.
52. Letter from Charles F. Clarke, couns<'!l for the school board, to Michigan Law
Reuiew, Feb. 6, 1974. See generally Brief for Petitioners.
53. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Oct. 15, 1973 [on file at the Michig(ln Law
Review]. The sole reference to due process in the case appears to have been the following exchange between Mrs. Picker, counsel for respondents, and Justice Stewart:
Q. Mrs. Picker, you have referred to the 14th Amendment. Do you view tliis
case as exclusively involving the Equal Protection Clause?
MRS. PICKER; Yes, we do, Your t{onar.
Q. You do not view it as involving the Due Process Clause at all?
MRS. PICKER: Well, Your Honor, we did not think to plead that. originally, and
I am not sure that that is particularly detrimental to our case. We have learned a
lot since the pleadings were originally filed in this case. It was prior to Stanley of
course, and indeed prior to Reed v. Reed. It seems to me as though we indeed had
a violation here of Due Process as well as Equal Protection, but we did not plead it.
And therefore we have not argued it.
Id. at 38.
54. As noted above, the Court also decided the Vlandis and Murry cases on grounds
that were only scantily argued and briefe\l by the partie$, See text accompanying notes
26-27 & 4l supra, The practic~ of the Court in these cases is certainly open to criticism.
It is unfair to the parties in that they are not allowed to present arguments to the
Court on the issue that the Court decides is controlling, and it is unfair to the Court
itself because the Court loses the benefit of an issue's being briefed and argued bdore
it. For one reaction to this type of judicial action, $ee Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
659-62 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In cases such as LaFleµr a jurisdictional problem may be presented because review of fetleral courts of appeals' decisions "shall be
restricted to the Federal questions presented ••••" 28 U,$.C. § 1254(2) (1970).
55. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4190.
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The. regulation involved in LaFleur, on the other hand, did not
restrict the receipt of government benefits but imposed a burden
(involuntary and unpaid maternity leave) upon the class of teachers
more than four months pregnant. This classification rested initially
upon a moral judgment-pregnant teachers should not be seen by
schoolchildren after they begin to "show"-but was later justified
by an empirical assessment-most women who are four-months pregnant are unable adequately to carry out teaching duties.
In each case, the draftsmen might have sought to achieve the
legislative purpose in limiting the class by writing that purpose
directly into the provision.66 This method would seem sufficiently
flexible to be immune from attack under the conclusive presumption doctrine, but it would give rise to at least two problems not
present in the statutes as they were actually written. First, such provisions would give considerable discretion to those charged with
administering the respective programs.67 With each administrator
applying the broad language in light of his individual biases, the
results would be uneven, thus denying equal treatment to those affected, and unpredictable, thus failing to provide adequate notice
to those coming under the law.58 Second, they would be much more
difficult and expensive to administer.60 It is, therefore, not surprising
that the draftsmen chose instead, for reasons of consistency, predictability, convenience, and economy, to draw "bright lines."
Yet, as the instant cases illustrate, and as the draftsmen of the
provisions were no doubt aware, 60 the use of such rules of thumb has
56. Thus, for example, the Connecticut statute might have read: Students wl10 intend to reside indefinitely in the state after graduation, or who have made significant
past contributions to the state, shall be classified as residents for tuition purposes.
5'7. Tussman 8: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF, L. REv. 341,
347 (1949).
.
58. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REv. 831, ff,12-43
(1923). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
59. As the government argued in Murry:
[A]ppellees' argument with respect to procedural due process is based on the
erroneous premises that the basic eligibility criterion is "need" and that applicants
should be entitled to demonstrate need notwithstanding their failure to satisfy
other statutory requirements. But since "need" is not a concept which either by its
nature or as a result of a long history of judicial consideration has a clearly ascer•
tainable content, Congress wisely chose not to make "need" the statutory standard
for food stamp eligibility. This decision reflected in part an awareness that the
determination of "need" on a case-by-case basis would be administratively unworkable.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 11.
60. It was argued in debate on the House floor that the tax dependency provision
was overinclusive: "In some ways the most surprising deficiency in the committee bill
is its total failure to deal effectively with those who do not deserve food stamps benefits.
It attempts to do this by denying stamps to many students and by imposing a work
provision. Both of these, however, will hurt many innocent and deserving members of
such households." 116 CoNG. REc. 42026 (1970) (remarks of Representative Conte).
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the vice of inaccuracy. Faced with the conflict between accurately
selecting those who are intended to -be burdened or benefited and
drafting statutes that can be effectively administered, most legislatures are likely to strike a compromise. Instead of trying to reach all
those who might conceivably come within the legisl?,tive intent,
they are satisfied to reach most of those, if that can be done with a
statute that will be reasonably consistent, predictable, convenient,
and economical in administration.
The decision of precisely how much inaccuracy to tolerate in
the name of effective administration involves the weighing of a number of factors. In addition to the administrative considerations, these
factors include the seriousness of the problem that the limiting provision is intended to remedy and the degree of hardship suffered by
those who are burdened or fail to receive a benefit. Thus, if the
abuse of food stamps by nonneedy college students were great, a
somewhat overbroad prophylactic countermeasure such as the tax
dependency amendment might be easier to tolerate than it would
be if the abuse were minimal. Similarly, if the degree of hardship
on college students classed as nonresidents were small, it might be
easier to tolerate an overinclusive nonresident category than it
would be if the hardship were great. And, if most women teachers
were indeed seriously incapacitated in the later stages of pregnancy,
an overbroad leave requirement would be more palatable.
This balancing of interests might well be viewed as a decision
within the legislative, rather than the judicial, competence. In any
case, Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur raise the basic constitutional issues of the degree of permitted legislative discretion in balancing
the need for accuracy in apportioning governmental burdens and
benefits against the need for line-drawing and sound administration,
and of the proper role of the Court in supervising the exercise of
this discretion.

I.

EQUAL PROTECTION: THE REJECTED APPROACH

As indicated above, the Vlandis and Murry cases were argued
primarily on equal protection grounds and can easily be analyzed
in equal protection terms. Both cases involved statutory provisions
that established two classes of persons with respect to government
benefits: nonrecipients (outstate applicants and tax dependent households) and recipients (instate applicants and non-tax dependent
households that met other criteria). LaFleur, argued solely on equal
protection grounds, is also susceptible of equal protection analysis.
The school board regulation established two classes: the burdened
(teachers more than four-months pregnant) and the nonburdened
(all other teachers). While the intensity of judicial review may vary
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depencling on the nature of the case, the basic equal protection issue
is whether these distinctions between classes are jmtified.
In consb;uing tlie equal protection cla'Qse, the Supreme Court
has developed a doctrinal pattern under which the intensity of judicial review altemates between two poles depending on the nature
of the case, ,At the activist pole, statutes involving ' 1fundamental interests" or "s'Qspect classifications" are strictly scrutinized, while at
the deferential pole, statutes involving social or economic matters are
allowed to stand if they exhibit minim,d rationality,
At least since Skinner v. 0 klahoma, 61 the Court has applied strict
sqµtiny to legislative classifications which impinge upon fundamen•
tal interests. Interests heretofore recognized as fundamental have
been the right to procreate, 62 the right to vote, 63 the right to travel, o-1
and possibly some aspects of personal privacy. 61i Strict scrutiny also ap•
plies when the legislation under review creates certain suspect
classifications, Classifications are suspect when based on race, 0o na,
tionality.67 and alienage; 68 probably suspect when based on illegitimacy69 and poverty (when poverty results in an absolute depriva,
tion); 70 and p9ssibly suspect when based on sex.71
Strict scrutiny means that the ordinary presumption in favor
of a statute's constitutionality72 is not entertained. Instead, the goveril!llent is given the burden of demonstrating that a ~•compelling
governmental interest'' makes the particular classification necessary.
Even if such a cop:1pelling interest is shown, the classification is not
deemed necessary if the same interest could be furthered by less
drastic means.7? Once the strict scrutiny test is invoked, the govern61. 316 u.s. 535 (1942),
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 4Q5 U.S. 330 (1972); :tiarper v. Virgipi 4 l3d, of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
64. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
65. See the Court's interpretation of Loving y, Virgiqia, 388 U.S, 1 (1967), and
Eisenstadt v. :Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)

(implying that a fundamental right of ,flrivacy had been recognized in these equal protection cases).
66. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
67. E.g., Oyama, v California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947),
68, Grali:un v. Rich~dson, 403 U,S, 365 (1971).
69. Gomez v. Per~, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
70. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). S11ey San .l\tltonio Indc;_\)endent School Dist,
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1973),
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion),
72. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Car•
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
73. Shapjro v. Thompson, 394 U.S, 618 (196P), See alsp ?,-!ichelman, The Supreme
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ment is rarely able to carry its heavy burden. 74 Thus, the choice of
the mode of adjudication is often determinative of the outcome of
the case.76
In Vlandis, the appellees argued that the strict scrutiny standard
was applicable due to an impingement on their right to travel.76
Relying heavily on Shapiro v. Thompson77 and Dunn v. Blumstein,78
cases that involved durational residency requirements for welfare
benefits and voter registration, respectively, the plaintiffs urged that
Connecticut's permanent, irrebuttable .residency classification penalized bona fide residents who had recently moved into the state.
While this argument is not without some merit, 79 the Court apparently viewed the burden on interstate travel created by higher
nonresident tuition rates as distinguishable from the burdens involved in Shapiro and Dunn, which were the total deprivation of
welfare benefits and the right to vote, the lattei: itself a fundamental
interest. In any event, the right to travel argument was not dealt
with by the Court.so
With the exception of Justice Matshall's concurrence in Vlandis,81 none or the opinions in Vlandis or Murry suggests that strict
Court, 1968 Term-Foteword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth A.mendtllent, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 20 n,34 (1969).
'74. For a rare example, see K.orematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusiort of all Japanese-Americans from certain West Coast areas upheld in view of the
tompelling state interest believed to have been created by the war emergency). See also
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
75, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J.; dissenting).
76. Brief for Appellees at 11-29.
77. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
78. 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
'79. 'rhe appellees \vere able to point to a study by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that 'cortcluded that "higher out-of-state tuition fees tend to discourage migratiort across Slate lines.'' Brief £or Appellees at 18, quoting U.S. Dept, of Health
Educ., &: Welfare, Analytic Repott on Residehce and Migratlon of College Students 2
(1968).
80. See also Starns v, Malkerson, 326 F. SUPP,· 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd. mem., 401
U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding nonresident tuition scheme).
81. Justice Mal'Shall's conellrtence does speak of "serious equal protection questions
raised by this and other tuition residency laws," 412 U.S. at 455, citing Dunn and
Shapiro, but does not discuss 111hat they might be.
Another line of strict scrutiny argument in the Vlandis situation would be to characte~e education as a fundamental interest. However, San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court expressly refused to declare
education to be a fundamental right, appears to have foreclosed this argument.
In Murry, no attempt was made to bring the case under the strict scrutiny standard.
Although at least one commentator has suggested that the interest in subsistehce is
fundamental as a consequence of the Shapiro decision, Michelman, supra note 73, at
40 n.94, a recent line of cases pas emphasized that the Court will apply the rational
relation standard of equal protection review to cases involving welfare legislation.
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (unequal reductions in federal welfare programs); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (reduction in social security benefits
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scrutiny was applicable. However, Justice Stewart's opinion in
Vlandis refers several times to the availability of "reasonable alternative means"82 with which to classify students as resident and nonresident, an approach highly reminiscent of the "less drastic means"
aspect of strict scrutiny review, although raised in the context of due
process rather than equal protection. This prompted Chief Justice
Burger to note in dissent: "There will be, I fear, some ground for
belief that the Court now engrafts the 'close judicial scrutiny' test
onto the Due Process Clause whenever we deal with something like
'permanent irrebuttable presumptions.' " 83
In LaFleur, the respondents argued both branches of the strict
scrutiny doctrine. They urged that the right to bear and raise children was fundamental84 and that the rule in question established a
classification based on sex, a suspect classification.86
As to the plaintiffs' fundamental right argument, the school
board replied that the only right affected by the maternity-leave rule
was "an asserted 'right' temporarily to be employed as a Cleveland
school teacher while in an advanced stage of pregnancy." 80 The
Court, however, appeared to recognize a possible impingement upon
the rights "of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
Iife"87 and stated that "[b]y acting to penalize the pregnant teacher
for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected
freedoms." 88 Nevertheless, the Court did not use this impingement
for recipients of workmen's compensation); Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471 (1970)
(AFDC benefit ceiling based on family size).
82, 412 U.S. at 451-52.
83. 412 U.S. at 462. A similar use of equal protection language in a due process case
was made in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ll3 (1973), a landmark decision subsuming the right
of a woman to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy under the right
of privacy. There the Court said that "[w]hcre certain 'fundamental rights' arc involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest.'" 410 U.S. at 155. Justice Rehnquist dissented:
The Court eschews the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in its reliance on
the "compelling state interest" test .••• But the Court adds a new wrinkle to this
test by transposi11g it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unless I misapprehend the consequences
of this transplanting of the "compelling state interest test," the Court's opinion will
accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it.
410 U.S. at 173.
84. Brief for Respondents at 41, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (19421
and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. ~rief for Respondents at 28-41.
86. Brief for Petitioners at 16.
87. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4189.
88. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4189.
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as a ground for invoking strict scrutiny but only to indicate a deprivation of liberty rendering the due process clause applicable.89
The only reference by any member of the Court to the plaintiffs'
sex classification argument is in a footnote to Justice Powell's concurrence, where he merely states that he does not reach the question.00
Unlike the strict scrutiny standard, the traditional equal protection standard creates a strong presumption of constitutionality for
legislation dealing with economic or social matters.91 This standard
puts the burden on the challenger to show that the statutory classification has no reasonable basis and enjoins the Court to assume any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could justify the classification.92 Legislation of even the most tenuous rationality has been upheld under this standard.93 Since this more restrained equal protection test has recently been held applicable to cases involving education94 and welfare,95 it would appear apposite to t!-'ie Vlandis, Murry,

~

89. It should be noted that, although the right to bear children is somewhat a£.
fected by the maternity leave requirement, the impingement is at most temporary and
indirect. Thus, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), involving total deprivation
of the right to procreate, is distinguishable. Perhaps the Court requires a direct and
heavy burden before the fundamental right-equal protection line of argument can succeed, while only an indirect impingement suffices as a deprivation of liberty for due
process purposes. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
19-22 (1973) (suggesting total deprivation of a right is necessary to trigger strict scrutiny).
90. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 n.2. There is also a question of whether LaFleur involved
a classification based on sex in the first instance. The school board argued ,that
the record is clear that the sex characteristic has nothing whatsoever to do with the
mandatory maternity leave •.•• It has nothing to do with sex as such, but only
when the condition of sex voluntarily creates another condition-pregnancy. Even
then pregnancy is not the determining classification, but it is only when the time
comes, on the basis of reasonable medical evidence and administrative necessity,
that her pregnancy makes the school teacher physically disabled within the environment of the school classroom that the classification applies.
Brief for Petitioners at 23-24. See also Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474
F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973) (Haynsworth, C.J.), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 22,
1974). In view of the purpose of strict scrutiny, which is to look 'more closely at statutes
that have an impact on groups with a history of discrimination, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), however, it should suffice that the rule
affected women and did not affect men. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (construing title VII of the Civil Rights Act). Nonetheless, the
Court avoided the issue, perhaps because of the difficulty foreseen in dealing with laws
prohibiting prostitution and job safety regulations prohibiting beards, to cite two common examples. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 21-24.
91. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
92. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961).
93. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
94. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
95. See cases cited in note 81 supra.
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and LaFleur cases. However, under this standard it appears that the
provisions involved would easily have been upheld.
As can be seen from the above discussion, the two-tiered system
of equal protection is inflexible. Choice of which tier is applicable in
a given case tends to predetermine the result. In the vast majority
of cases, if strict scrutiny is applied, the legislation is struck do'Wn;
if the minimum rationality standard is invoked, the legislation is
sustained. Yet there are cases, such as Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur,
in which the Court may desire to intervene despite the presence of
a rational basis for the statutory classification and the absence of a
fundamental interest or suspect classification. Two approaches have
been suggested that would permit a more flexible equal protection
analysis. 96
Professor Gerald Gunther has observed a trend in certain of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions97 toward an "intensified means
scrutiny," which would "close the wide gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old
not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the minimal
from virtual abdication to gehuine judicial inquiry!' 08 Guhther
denominates this middle tier the 11newer" equal protection, which,
he says, would "have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has hever been formally abandoned: that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends." 99
This approach demands Uvo prerequisites. First, a legislative purpose must be imputed to the statute apart from its operative language and its total effect. Othenvise, there would be no distinction
between the legislative means (specifically, language and effect) and
the legislative end. Second, the Court must be willing and able to
engage in empiric "legislative" fact-finding in order to assess whether
the means "substantially further" the ends.
In Vlandis and Murry, the Court was willing to find a purpose
behittd the provisions involved, 100 since this ·was necessary before the
conclusive presumption analysis could be applied. 101 However, it
96. See generally Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New £qual
Protection, 72 :M1CH. L. REv. 508 (19'74).
9'7. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Stir. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (19'72); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (19'71).
98. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I,
24 (1972).
99. Id. at 20.
100. See note 45 supra and text accompanying notes 28 8.: 55 supra.
101. Although Justice Douglas did not discuss the purpose of the food-stamp J?ro•
gram in Murry, Justice Stewart, the author of P'landis and LaFleur, did so itt his concurrence. See note 45 supra. It is necessary for n court applying the test to Jmpute a
purpose to the statute other than that indicated by the operative statutory language. It
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does not appear that data were available from which the efficacy of
the means in furthering the ends could be established. Thus, the
"newer" equal protection approach could not be applied, at least
not in Gunther's sense of a "genuine judicial inquiry." In LaFleur,
on the other hand, the substantial medical testimony102 and literature103 before the Court would have provided a basis for assessing the
degree of disability encountered in late pregnancy. Moreover, Justice
Powell, concurring in the result, appeared to apply a form of meansfocused analysis. While purpotting to apply "rational basis standards
of equal protection review," 104 his standard was stricter than the
minimum rationality test. Rather than assuming any conceivable
state of facts that could justify the classification, Justice Powell
would have required that the regulations "rationally serve some legitimate articulated or obvious state interest."105 Further, instead of
placing the burden on the challenger to show the lack of a rational
basis, Powell would have plated the burden on the school board:
The boards emphasize teacher absenteeism, classroom discipline, the
safety of school children, and the safety of the expectant mother and
her unborn child. No doubt these are legitimate concerns. But the
boards have failed to demonstrate that these interests are in fact
threatened by the continued employment of pregnant teachers.106
Thus, Justice Powell, at least, would have been 'Willing to invoke the
"newer" equal protection in the LaFleur situation. His means-focus
is apparent from his conclusion: "I believe the linkage between the
boards' legitimate ends and their chosen meaJ:?-S is too attenuated to
support those portions of the regulations overturned by the Court."107
In his concurrence with the Murry opinion, Justice Marshall suggested an equal protection approach in which the interests involved
in each case would be balanced in accordance with the "rudiments
of fairness." 108 In Justice Marshall's view, the Court "must assess the
public and private interests affected by a statutory classification and
then decide in each instance whether individualized determination
is required or categorical treatment is permitted by the Constitution/'109 Under this cipptoach the 'weights given the cortfl.itting inter1s then possible for the reviewing court to conclude that the operative language conclusively presumes that the plaintiffs were not members of the class intended to be
benefited.
102. See Appendix at 89a-187a.
103. Brief for Petitioners at 41-66 (Exhibit A).
104. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193.
105. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 n.2.
106. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 (emphasis added).
107. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193,
108. 413 'u.S. at 519.
109. 413 U.S. at 519. See also San Antonio indepertdent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ests must ultimately rest on the subjective assessments of the decisionmaker; the approach may lack predictability and consistency, and
may result in extensive policy-making by those least equipped to
make such decisions. This approach may also allow vague, conclusory
opinions, since no decision-making structure is imposed on courts;
decisions may be obfuscated behind general "balancing" language.
But balancing may have the advantage of requiring the Court to
make explicit the policy choices it is now implicitly making under
the "rationality" and "strict scrutiny" standards. While not without
support,11° the balancing approach to equal protection does not appear to have the assent of a majority of the Court at present.
II.

DUE PROCESS:

THE

CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION APPROACH

Perhaps the Court rejected an equal protection analysis because
of the difficulty of reconciling a holding of unconstitutionality in
Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur with traditional equal protection precedents. But the conclusive presumption doctrine, while serving as a
safety valve to escape the rigidity of current equal protection doctrine, is not without substantial difficulties of its own.
Under equal protection two established and two developing approaches exist with which to analyze problems of inequality.111
Their formulations, to some extent even those of the newer ones,
are fleshed out by a history of judicial decisions. The Supreme
Court, instead of using the existing methods of analysis, adopted a
highly questionable approach, with little help from counsel.
A.

Deprivation of "Life, Liberty or Property": The
Threshold Issue

The conclusive presumption doctrine has its source in the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While this
issue received little attention in Vlandis, and none at all in Murry,
the language of the Constitution requires that due process be afforded only where there is a deprivation of "life, liberty or prop110. Justice Marshall's concurrence in Murry was not joined by any of his colleagues.
His dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), was
joined by Justice Douglas. However, Justice White appeared to support Justice Mar•
shall's view in Vlandis. See 412 U.S. at 458-59. See also Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75, 79-80; Comment, Fundamental Personal
Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 807, 816 (1973); Note,
Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 851-53 nn.39-40 (1969).
111. Another questionable approach to problems of inequality has been the use of
the bill of attainder clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) (White, J., dissenting).
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erty." 112 It is at least arguable that no such deprivation occurred
in either Vlandis or Murry. (In LaFleur the Court found a deprivation of "liberty."113)
•
It has recently been contended that "the clause applies whenever
the state deals with an individual, so long as the interests threatened
are not wholly frivolous." 114 Moreover, the Court has itself suggested
that the test is "state action that adjudicates important interests." 115
However, in the recent case of Board of Regents v. Roth,116 the
Court gave substantive content to the concepts of "liberty" and
"property" as used in the due process clauses. Roth involved the due
process claim of a nontenured college teacher who had not been rehired at the conclusion of his one-year contract term. The college
gave no reason for its failure to continue his employment, and the
teacher, who believed that the reason was the exercise of his freedom
of expression, demanded a due process hearing. The Court held the
due process clause inapplicable since he had been deprived of
neither liberty nor property. Conceding that the teacher's interest
in continued employment may be an important one, the Court stated
that "to determine whether the due process requirements apply in
the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of
the interest at stake."117 The Roth Court's discussion of the "property" concept is of particular relevance to the Vlandis and Murry
situations:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus, the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly [397 U.S. 254 (1970)], had a claim
of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute
defining eligibility for them. The recipients had not yet shown that
they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility. But we
held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt
to do so.118
112. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). See also O'Neil, Of Justice
Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 SUP. Cr. REv.
161, 178-79.
113. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
114. Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1212, 1226 (1973)._
ll5. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
89 (1972).
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
117. 408 U.S. at 570-71 (emphasis original).
118. 408 U.S. at 577.
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This reasoning would indicate that there was no deprivation of
"property" in Vlandis or Murry. However, the appellees in Vlandis
argued that they were deprived of property "through increased tuition charges/'110 and the Court apparently accepted this argument,
stating that the "statute operated to deprive them of a significant
amount of their money without due process of law." 120
A more accurate description of the Vlandis situation would be
that the state failed to accord the appellees the degree of educational
subsidy that it granted to statutory residents. Viewed in this light,
the issue is whether appellees had a property interest in this state
subsidy. According to Roth, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits . • . . To
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 121
Unlike the plaintiffs in Goldberg v. Kelly, 122 who "had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute
defining eligibility for them," the Vlandis plaintiffs made no claim
to statutory entitlement. Rather, they freely admitted that, under
the terms of the statute, they were classified as nonresidents. The
statute itself, therefore, conferred no property right.
Looking to the "purpose" rather than the letter of the statute,
it could be argued that there was an "understanding" that all
persons with domiciliary intent should receive the resident-tuition
subsidy. Plaintiffs might claim a property interest derived from this
understanding. However, this interpretation of the legislative purpose would be closer to a "unilateral expectation" than to an "understanding." Because 0£ the fluidity with which statutory purposes may
be manipulated,123 they provide a rather unstable basis £tom which
to derive a property interest. For example, it seems plain £-rotn the
language and effect of the Connecticut statute that its purpose was
not to provide a resident-tuition subsidy to all persons with domiciliary intent, but rather to provide the subsidy to most of those persons, to the extent that they could be ascertained with a minimum of
administrative expense. If this was the purpose of the statute, then
the legislative "understanding" included the possibility that some
persons, including the appellees, would not receive the benefit despite theit actual domiciliary intent.
119. Brief for Appellees at 53.
120. 412 U.S. at 452.
121. 408 U.S. at 576-77.
122. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
123. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Ftotectidn, SJ? YAtE L.J.
123, 132 (1972).
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Turning to Murry, the Court's opinion nowhere mentions the
property deprivation requirement, possibly because the issue was not
raised by the government. In addition, the appellees did not attempt
to show a deprivation df "property," but me't'ely asserted that "(p)rbcedural due process is applicable whenever govetnmental action denies or terminates an individual's rights br benefi.ts."124 But, as in
Vlandis, the plaintiffs admitted that they were ineligible for benefits
under the statute. Indeed, such ineligibility was a necessary element
of their constitutional challenge. If, as the government argtied,125
they were actually eligible for food stamps, they wduld have had no
standing to challenge the substance of the statute.126
As in Vlandis, a basis for a daim. of entitlement could be the
purpose of the statute. One source for a purpose is the Fodd Stamp
Act's "[c]ongressiohal declaration of policy," which states that the
objective is to "raise leve1s of httttitfon among low-ihcome households.''127 But this objective can be achieved without providing food
stamps to all heedy households. Another pbssible source of the statutory purpose is the provision for eligibility standards, which ate designed to limit the program "to those households whose income and
other financial resources are determined to be substantial limiting
factors in permitting them to purchase a nutritionally adequate
diet," 128 Bt'lt this proVisioi:l is, at least on its face, an "understanding" only that households with sufficient resources should not get
food stamps. Only by negative inference cat1 it be said that households with insufficient income shdUld get relief, and another l11rge
step is required to find a congressional intent that all such households should get relief. Again, Congress may well have been content
to reach most such households.
If the appellees in Vlandis and Murry could take little comfort
in either the express language of the statutes ot in their legislative
purpdses, an additional source of an "understanding" on which to
base a property right might be the equal protection clause. Thus,
the ::tppellees might argrte that the equal protection clause guarantees that all persons similarly situated will receive similar behefi.ts;
therefore, if others sufficiently like them were giveh food stanlps or
a higher tuition subsidy, there was hti understanding that the appel-

.
.
124. Brief for Appellees at 62 n.•.
1
125. Brief for Appellants at 5-6 n.3, See also 413 U.S. at 521-22 (Black.mun, J., dissenting).
126. 1f they were eligible under the statute, plaintiffs could not claim they were
personally "aggrieved in fact" by the substance of the statute. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Rathel', their injury would stem from an hnptoper adminis•
trative application.
127. 7 u.s.c. § 2011 (1970).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1970).
~

~
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lees should have these benefits as well. To the extent that the equal
protection clause and the concept of equality implicit in the fifth
amendment place a duty on the state and federal governments to
act equitably in their distributive roles,1 29 there is a correlative right
in the citizenry to these benefits.
There may be three problems with this argument. First, there is
the Roth Court's statement that "[p]roperty interests . . . are not
created by the Constitution."180 This statement, however, refers to
the due process clause and appears to stand only for the proposition
that procedural due process, by itself, does not create rights but
merely protects already existing rights. The right to equal treatment
in disbursements of governmental benefits would be an already
existing right.
Second, the Court has often recognized that the equal protection
clause does not demand "mathematical nicety" in apportioning social
benefits.131 However, it would seem that any deviation from equality
would be a deprivation. The question of whether it was justified, due,
for example, to administrative convenience or the difficulty in structuring precise classifications, would be resolved in determining
whether the denial of the property interest was justified.
The third criticism of this approach seems more serious than the
others. If these cases are to be analyzed in part under the equal protection clause, it is conceptually cleaner to approach them in terms
of the already established equal protection doctrine, which has gradually developed to deal with problems of equal treatment, rather
than by a circuitous route through the due process clause.
An application of the concept of equality might also lend itself
to classifying the interest involved as "liberty." The due process
clause does protect liberties, and liberties are created by the constitution. One of the great liberties in any just society is a right to
equal treatment in governmental disbursements of benefits and liabilities.132 But, again, a procedural due process approach seems inappropriate, as there is a time-tested method for dealing with this
problem-the equal protection concept.
Another possible interpretation of Vlandis and Murry is that they
indeed stand for the proposition that due process is required whenever the state deals with an individual so long as the interests threatened are not wholly frivolous. This would erode Roth and, like the
application of equality concepts, significantly expand the definition of
"life, liberty, or property" for due process purposes. Prior due process
129. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62, 303 (1971).
130. 408 U.S. at 577.
131. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
132. J. RAWLS, supra note 129, at 62, 303.
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cases have involved deprivations in the sense of taking a person's
life, 133 taking away some form of liberty,134 taking away something
the individual had privately acquired,135 ·withdrawal of governmental
benefits from persons who claimed statutory entitlement,186 or suspension of a governmental privilege already acquired.137 LaFleur is
not greatly different from these cases, but Vlandis and Murry appear
to be the first cases in which the Court has held the due process
clause applicable to the failure to confer governmental benefits on
individuals who admittedly had no entitlement under the terms of
the statute.138 This significant expansion of due process protection,
unfortunately, ·was made without the help of briefs on the issue and
was never directly addressed in the opinions.
B.

The Procedure-Substance Distinction

Due process cases are conventionally divided into "procedural"
and "substantive" cases.139 The two approaches are distinguishable
in three important respects.
First, there is a difference in function. Procedural due process
typically deals with the enforcement of public policy as determined
by the legislature and expressed by statute.140 It requires that persons who are deprived of life, liberty, or property by the law be
given reasonable notice and a fair hearing.141 It is basically a guarantee against arbitrary exertions of executive and judicial power.142
Substantive due process, on the other hand, functions as a check on
the legislative formulation of policy and calls into question the em133. E.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (death penalty).
134. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incarceration).
135. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (custody of children); Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (ta.xation).
136. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
137. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license).
138. This statement may not be strictly accurate if Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), is taken into account. While decided according to the equal protection strict
scrutiny standard, Shapiro involved due process to the extent that a District of Columbia provision was invalidated, since equal protection is applicable to the federal government only by way of the fifth amendment due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). But the Court clearly considered Shapiro an equal protection rather
than a due process case, and, in addition, the statute was held to impinge upon the
right to travel, so that a deprivation of "liberty" was involved.
139. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 233 (1962).
140. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048,
1064-65 (1968).
141. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62, 267-71 (1970).
142. P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 601 (4th ed. 1972).
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pirical basis for, or the propriety of adopting, certain measures.
Thus, it guarantees against arbitrary exertions of legislative power.148
Second, there is a difference in compatibility with the judicial
role. Since courts have daily experience with the conduct of trials
and the administration of justice, the setting of procedural standards
is within the judicial sphere of competence, and decisions in this
area may more readily receive public acceptance. 144 Judicial intrusions into the substantive policy-making atea, on the other hand, are
likely to be viewed as disregard for the separation of judicial and
legislative functions. 145 This separation of powers is fundamental to
a majoritarian system of government, which assumes that it is preferable to have policy set by elected and responsible legislators rather
than by appointed judges.146 In addition, policy-making in the legislative halls allows for a greater input by different societal factions
than does decision-making in judicial chambers. There is also a
practical advantage: Legislatures may have superior institutional
provision for factual input on broad policy questions.147
Third, as a consequence of the above two differences, there has
developed a difference in standard of review. In procedural due
process cases the Coutt has openly espoused a balancing test. For
example, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly formulated the test as
follows: "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether
the recipient's interest ih avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.''148 While a balancing test
was once in vogue in substantive due process cases as well,140 the
Court more recently has left the balancing of policy considerations
to the legislative branch, adopting a substantive due process stan143. A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 233.
144. Rather, supra note 140, at 1064-65.
145. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963). See also Ratner, supra note 140,
at 1063.
146. A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 18-20. See also Commager, Judicial Review and
Democracy, in JUDICIAL :REvmw AND THE SUI'REME CoURT 64, 72-73 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
147. Oregon v. Mitchell, 4<10 U.S. 112, 241-48 (1970) (Brennan, J.); P. Brest, Processes
of Constitutional Adjudication 5.20-.24 (Tent. Draft, Nov. 1972); Wellington, Common
1.aw Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 266 (1973) ("['I]he Court is not well-suited to the development of poli•
cles.').
148, 397 U.S, at 262·63. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, ll78 (1971):
"The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon
the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings."
149. See Comment, supra note HO, at 807: "The pre-1937 Court's approach to inter•
preting the vague provisions of the due process clauses may best be characterized as a
'balancing' of the burden imposed on a person's life, liberty or property by govern•
mental regulation against the governtnental justifications for the burdens." See also
Ratner, $Uprd note 140, at 1071.
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<lard of extreme deference to the Iegislatures150 and actively reviewing
only legislation dealing "With the right of privacy.161 As with twotiered equal protection, this approach is a recognition of the judiciary's limited competence in dealing with broad social and. economic policy considerations.162
The appellees in Vlandis and Murry clearly couched their due
process arguments in procedural terms.163 In Murry, the appellees
argued that "a conclusive statutory presumption, that may be erroneous, and adversely affects the rights of persons, is violative of
procedural due process." 154 In Vlandis, the a.ppellees claimed that
"[t]he deprivation of a state provided entitlement such as education
must be accompanied by the procedural due process required by
the Fourteenth .Amendment." 155
The Court in each case simply referred to "due process," omitting a label of either substantive or prbcedural. In certaih respects,
however, the Court employed a procedural analysis. ¥or ex.ample,
the cases cited are primarily procedural.166 Furthermore, the very
term "conclusive presumption" suggests that the cases turn on a
matter of procedure, as does the following language from the Vlandis
opinion: "[S]tandards of due process require that the State allow
such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that
he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.'' 157 And Justice Marshall, in his Vlandis concurrence, stated that the case concerned "nothing more than the procedures by which the State determines whether or not a person is a resident for tuition purposes."158
Yet, despite this language of procedure, other language used by
the Court is more reminiscent of the substantive rational relation
150. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
151. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
152. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); authorities cited in note 147 supra.
153. No due process claim was made in LaFleur. See note 53 supra. The LaFleur
respondents did use the phrase "irrebuttable presumption" in their brief, see Brief
for Respondents at 51, but not in connection with a due process argumertt. 011 the
government side in Vlandis and Murry, the due process issue was either whoily ignored
or casually dealt with in a few paragraphs. See notes 26 &: 41 supra. In Murry, for
example, the government dismissed the due process argument as "nothing more than
a restated equal protection argument in disguise." Reply Brief for Appellants at 10.
154. Brief for Appellees at 65.
155. Brief for Appellees at 57.
156. The Court relied both iii. Vlandis, see 412 U.S. at 446, 451, and in Murry, see
413 U.S. at 513-14, on such cases as Bell v. Btmon, 402 U.S. 53_5 (1971), and Stanley v.
lliinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), both of which have been referred to elsewhere by the
Court as procedural due process cases. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. !i64,
!i72 nn.10-11 (1972).
157. 412 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
158. 412 U.S. at 4!i!i (emphasis added).
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test than of the procedural balancing standard. In Vlandis, the
Court characterized the statute involved as "wholly unrelated"lllo to
the state's objective and as "arbitrary."160 In Murry, the statutory
provision was said to have "no relation" 161 to its purpose of determining need and not to be a "rational measure"162 of a household's
need. Thus, the opinions lack the internal consistency necessary to
classify the Court's approach as either procedural or substantive due
process.
The Vlandis and Murry cases appear in fact to be purely substantive in nature. First, the appellees admitted that the relevant
statutory provisions had been properly applied. Rather than challenging the procedures of application, they, in effect, challenged the
legislative fact-finding and demanded that new issues be made relevant.163 In essence, the Court required that the states extend benefits
to those in the appellees' class; in procedural cases the Court does
not expand the class of people entitled to receive the benefit but
only deals with what procedures are necessary when affecting that
interest.
Second, to the extent that it was the policy of the legislature to
further administrative values by narrowly defining the relevant issues, the Vlandis and Murry decisions were substantive in their conclusion that a more closely tailored selection process outweighed the
policies of consistency, predictability, economy, and convenience.
In sum, the Vlandis and Murry opinions generated a degree of
analytic confusion by their failure to distinguish between procedural
and substantive due process. While the opinions were framed in
language suggesting procedure (for example, "conclusive presumption"), the basic issue was one of substantive policy. Further, the
Court employed language suggesting a "rational relation" standard,
which has been associated in recent cases with substantive, but not
procedural, due process.
Dissenting in both Vlandis and Murry, Justice Rehnquist char159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

412
412
413
413
413

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 441, 449, 450.
at 450.
at 508, 514.
at 508, 514.
U.S. at 508, 514. In Murry, for example, appellees argued that "the ta.\:

dependency provision was enacted because Congress presumed that any household containing a member who had been claimed as a 'tax dependent' for the prior year-lmd
sufficient current income and resources 'to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. • .' "
Brief for Appellees at 58. They proceeded to argue that this presumption was "very
frequently erroneous," id. at 60, and demanded that they be permitted to demonstrate
"that adequate food resources are not available to them," id. at 71, charging, in effect,
that Congress had made the wrong issue relevant to its objective of determining need.
Similarly, the appellees in Vlandis urged that the legislature had omitted a significant issue: "The statutory scheme in this case excludes the important factor of residency from the state's determination to deprive or grant the state provided entitlement
in issue [i.e., the instate tuition subsidy]." Brief for Appcllees at 51.
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acterized the cases as examples of substantive due process in the
now-discredited164 sense of the term.165 The judicial role connoted
by "substantive due process" is illustrated in such pre-1937 cases as
Lochner v. New York166 and Coppage v. Kansas. 161 In Lochner, the
Court held a New York statute that limited employment in bakeries
to a maximum of sixty hours per week and ten hours per day to be
an unconstitutional denial of liberty of contract under the due process clause. In Coppage, the Court struck do-wn on similar grounds a
Kansas statute outlawing "yellow dog" contracts-labor contracts
that made refraining from joining a union a condition of employment. These cases and others of their era involved a judicial assessment of the social or economic wisdom of particular governmental
regulation of business within the context of a Constitution assumed
to embody the principle of laissez-faire and to imply a very active
policy-making function for the Court.168
An analogous judicial role in Vlandis or Murry would seem to
require greater intrusions into the policy sphere than in fact took
place. In these cases, the Court did not intrude into the legislative
decisions to grant a higher tuition subsidy to residents than to nonresidents, and to operate a food-stamp program for needy households.
The extent of the Court's substantive intrusion was to dictate that
the purpose be to reach all similarly situated beneficiaries, not just
most, as the legislature prol;>ably intended, and to require that
greater administrative expense be allowed if necessary to, effectuate
this goal more accurately. In fact, the Court held the basic goal so
important that it required it to be even more accurately carried out
than the legislature intended. As the Court was only finely tuning
the distribution mechanism, not reassessing the total program, J ustice Rehnquist's comparison of these cases with the "substantive due
process" era may be s<;>mewhat exa:ggerated.

C. Means Orientation
Nevertheless, the Court's substantive role in Vlandis, LaFleur,
and Murry is not without some difficulty. If the Court's "rational
164. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1972); Wellington, supra note 147, at 280.
165. In Vlandis, he stated that the decision "harks back to a day when the principles
of substantive due process had reached their zenith in this Court." 412 U.S. at 467-68. In
Murry, he disputed the Court's procedural "conclusive presumption" analysis: "There
is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds presumptions which conclude factual inquiries without a
hearing • • • , and, on the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted prophylactic limitation on the dispens~tion of funds which is designed to cure systemic
abuses." 413 U.S. at 524.
166. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
167. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
168. See Ratner, supra note 140, at 1071.
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relation" language was intended to imply that the modern, deferential, substantive due process standard as formulated in such cases
as Ferguson v. Skruptt169 was being applied, then that standard has
been given new teeth in the instant cases. The judicial deference
that the Ferguson standard embodies is markedly lacking. As Justice
Rehnquist stated with regard to the Murry decision: "To be sure,
there tnay be no perfect correlation between the fact that the taxpayer is part of a household which has income exceeding food stamp
eligibility standards and his provision of enough support to raise his
dependent's household above such standards. But there is some correlation, and the provision is, therefore1 not ittational."170
The Vlandis, LaFleur, and Mitr-ty decisions may represent a middle ground betweeh the "old" substantive due process of the Lochner
era and the "new" substahtive due process 0£ the Ferguson variety.
While the wisdom of the bMic legislative policy was not challenged,
the accuracy of the means adopted to effectuate that policy was held
inadequate. Thus, the instant cases may parallel, in the due process
area, the "means-focused" standard that Professor Gunther has perceived in recent equal protection cases.171
Any means-focused approach has substantial problems, however.
It presupposes that a reasonably dear ends/means distinction can be
drawn, specifically, that it is 'ptlssible to identify the legislative "purpose" and then independently judge the rationality of the mearts employed to put that purpose into effect. If the purpose 0£ any statute is
taken to be coextensive with its language or practical effect, then
ends and means merge, and the legislation is by definition perfectly
"rational." Only if a purpose is imputed to the legislature beyond
the face of itS statute can the issue of the rationality of the means
have any relevance. Yet, OI1ce this stage of imputing a purpose is
reached, the Court can define it in such a way that practically any
degree of "rationality'' can be achieved. Was the purpose in Vlandis,
for example, to grant a higher tuition subsidy to all students with
domiciliary intent, as the Court apparently assumed, or was it to
reach as many such students as possible, consisteht with an easily administered standard, or was it to subsidize only the narrow class of
students with substantial relationships with the state? All have some
plausibility, yet the first "purpose" would obviously make the Standard adopted appear less rational than the others.
A second problem ·with the means-focused approach, as noted
earlier, is the necessity of empiric, "legislative" fact-finding by the
Court. Thus, i£ the Court in Vlandis decided that the legislature's
purpose was to _grant higher tuition subsidies to all students ·with
169. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
170. 413 U.S. at 525.
171. See Gunther, supra note 98, at 26-30.
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domiciliary intent, it would ~till have to determine whether the
statutory definition of nonresident as one whose address wa~ QU~ide
the state at the time of application "sqbstantially furthered" that
purpose. Statistical dat;i would be required to determine whether the
vast majority of Ol,lt-of-&tat~ applicants lacked domiciliary intent and
continued to lack domiciliciry intent throughoqt their attendance at
the university. I£ so, then the statutory means would presumably pe
"rational."
Such data were, of cot1rse, not available to the Court in. Vl(lndi$.
Perhaps for this reason the Court appeared to demand perfect congruence between the statutory classification and the legii;lative purpose it was designed to effectuate, holding the classifkation "irrational" since it was not; "necessarily ot 11niver11ally true in fact," 1 n A.
mt:!ans-foc1.1sed approach with such a strict standard of "ratio11ality'1
raises problems of practical government. As Profe~sor Brest has observed, "[T]o refuse to allow departures £row. congruence to l>e j-11~tifi.ed in terms of efficiency . • , would increase the co:;ts of governmental regulation so as to price most regulation out of existence."17a
A final problem with the :;trkt :roeans-focu:;ed approad:i is that
legislators draft J;:,ills within budgetary c.onstraints, The operative,
classificatory language is often an attempt to strU<.e a bal~i:;e 1;,e~veep.
those whom. the legislators feel the state can afford to benefit an,d all
those who may possibly or marginally de~erve som~ help. The 11se <;>~
broad classifications is a tool for accomplishing tnis goal. A reviewing
court is, of course, under no such con:;traint and m.ay fail to con~
sider the state's bu,dgetary problems,
D. Analytical Difficulties
Perhaps the most serious defect in the conclustve presumption
doctrine is that it rests upon a disingen{lous, :misleading analysis. lt
has long been recqg11ized that there cannot be a, c;9nclt1siv~ "presumption," at least if the term is used to refe:i; to an evidentiary h11r..
den-shifting d.evice.174 When a statute provides that ce:ftfl.i:Jl con~equences shall flow from fact A and then provides that froJil proof of
fact B the existence of fact A shall be. conclusively pre.~u,med, tl!e
practical effect is to make fact A irrelevant. The same result would
be achieved by making the statutory consequences turn directly on
fact B. The only genuine constitutional questio11- in this sitt1-ation
is whether it is permissible to de:i;i,ve the given consequences from
172. 41~ U.S. at 45~.
173. P. Brest, supra note 147, at 5.63.
174. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2492 (3d ed. 1940). See also Brosman, The Statutory
Presumption, 5 TULANE L. REv. 17, 24 (1930); Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their
Constitutionality and Legal Effect, IO TEXAS L. REv. 34 (1931).
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fact B. A procedural due process claim based upon a supposed right
to present evidence of fact A is no more warranted than a claim
concerning any other irrelevant issue. While it might be esthetically
more pleasing for the legislature to say what it means-formulating
the provision directly in terms of fact B, instead of resorting to the
fiction of a conclusive presumption-this stylistic flaw violates no
one's procedural rights.
Two early cases in which the conclusive presumption doctrine
was invoked involved at least this statutory cosmetic defect. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin 175 and Heiner v. Donnan116 dealt with provisions
for the taxation of gifts that conclusively presumed that gifts made
within a certain fixed period177 prior to the donor's death were made
"in contemplation of death.'' Fact A in these statutes was the intent
of the donor to give in contemplation of death. Fact B was the completion of the gift within the statutory period before death. The
practical effect was to impose tax at a certain rate upon all gifts made
within the statutory period. The actual donative intent was made
irrelevant.
The real constitutional issue in these cases was whether it was
permissible to impose a tax upon all gifts made within a certain
period regardless of the donor's intent, when the legislative purpose
was to eliminate estate tax .evasion in the form of de facto testamentary gifts disguised as inter vivos transfers. The statutes did, of
course, create overinclusive burdening classifications to the extent
that some gifts made within the statutory period were genuine inter
vivos gifts, that would otherwise be taxed at a lower rate or not taxed
at all. Thus, an equal protection argument could have been made,
through with little chance of success under the then-prevailing standard.11s
The Heiner Court, however, saw the issue as that of a litigant's
"right to prove the facts of his case.''170 The Court failed to explain how facts irrelevant under the statute could be considered "the
facts of his case" and asserted merely that "whether the [conclusive]
presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of substantive law, it
constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a
fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actual175.
176.
177.
178.

270 U.S. 230 (1926) (McReynolds, J.).
285 U.S. 312 (1932) (Sutherland, J.).

In Schlesinger, the period was six years; in Heiner, two years,
The Court had held in 1911 that "[a] classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend [the equal protection] clause merely because it is not made with mathe•
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality," and that "if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
179. 285 U.S. at 329.
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ity .•.." 180 The reasoning of the Heiner case has been severely
criticized by Professor Morgan, who remarked that "[i]t would require very efficient mental blinders . . . to conceal from the intellectual vision the very evident purpose of the enactment to impose
a tax upon all gifts made within two years of the death of the
donor."181
If the conclusive presumption analysis was inappropriate in
Schlesinger and Heiner, it was even less appropriate in Vlandis,
Murry, and LaFleur. The tax statutes in the earlier cases at least
appeared on a superficial reading to make one fact relevant and then
foreclose the taking of evidence on that fact. In contrast, the provisions in the instant cases were ·written directly in terms of the operative fact B, to continue the abstract example. Fact A is only to be
found in the hypothetical purpose of the statutes. It is difficult to
find anything resembling a "conclusive presumption" in the language
of either the Connecticut tuition statute, the tax dependency amendment to the Food Stamp Act, or the maternity leave rule. Thus, in
Vlandis the Court found the legislative purpose to be to charge
higher tuition to nonresidents, and the Connecticut legislature was
said to have conclusively presumed that all out-of-state applicants
were and remained nonresidents. In Murry, the Court found the
purpose to be to provide food stamps to all needy households, and
Congresss was said to have conclusively presumed that all tax-dependent households were not needy. In LaFleur, the Court found the
purpose to be to grant leave to disabled teachers, and the school
board was said to have conclusively presumed that all women more
than four-months pregnant were incapable of teaching.
. On this analysis, of course, every statute could be said to presume conclusively that its classification is accurate in light of its
purpose in every case. Some examples of how widely this conclusive
presumption analysis could be applied will be examined in the next
section. But it might be wrong to suppose that the Court is misled
by its own analysis. That the conclusive presumption doctrine fulfills
a particular need can be seen by viewing the cases in which it has
been applied.
The conclusive presumption doctrine has been applied exclusively
in cases that involved overinclusive burdening classifications.182 This
means that all of the cases were amenable to an equal protection
analysis. Yet, with two exceptions,183 none was expressly decided on
180. 285 U.S. at 329.
181. Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations upon Presumptions Created by
State Legislation, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 323, 329 (1934).
182. See cases in notes 1-2, 4, 6-10 supra.
183. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

830

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '72:800

equal protection grounds, perhaps because equal protection precedent would have led to sustaining the legislation.
The Court was not disposed to sustain the legislation, as the
results in the conclusive presumption cases demonstrate. One possible explanation is that most of the cases have involved burdens
that worked a particular hardship on the individuals involved. Thus,
in Stanley v, Jllinois, 18i q :futher's children were taken away; in ]Jell
v. }]urson,186 a tr,weling country parson's d1;iver'~ license was SUS•
pended; in Murry~ impoverished households were denied food stamp
relief; and in LaFleur, teachers were required to take unpaid leave.
The hardship natµre of these cases may have eJD.phasized the need
for an escape from 1;igid equal protection doctrine. This way of
limiting the cases seems reasonable as statutes dealing with important personal interests should be precisely drawn. It does not, however, explain Vlandis, which does not appear to deal with similar
hardship.

E. An Appraisal of the Technique
If the doctrine is to be manageable any future use must be
limited to its past role as a hardship exception to established equa]
protection precedent.186 The Vlandis opinion, however, implies that
a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption," that is, a statutory
classification, !llight be unconstitutional whenever "that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State
has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination."181 If this language is taken at face value, the doctrine may be
widely applicable indeed, for the statutory presumptio:n that is
"necessarily or universally true in fact" is extremely rare. And, if
the means available to the state for a case-by-case determination of
college students' domiciliary intent are "reasonable," then it would
seem that no issue of fact would pose too great an administrative
burden under the Vlandis standard. Chief Justice Burger marshalled
a parade of horribles:

[L]iterally thousands of state statutes create classifications permanent
. in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legislative classifications are, and might be improved on by individualized determinations so as to avoid the untoward results produced here due to the
184, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
185. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
186. See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S, 356 (1973), in wblch
the Court rejected a conclusive presumption challenge to a Federal Reserve Board regu•
lation that provided for disclosure of finance charges in any consumer sale payable in
more than four installments. The challenger, a large corporation, was threatened by
no hardship.
187. 412 U.S. at 452.
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very unusual facts of this case. Both the anomaly present here and
the argu.ible alternative~ to it do not di{fer fro:,;n those present whe,:i,
for example, a State provides that a person may not be licen~ed to
practice medicine or law unless he or she is a graduate of an. accredited professional graduate sc;:hool; a perfectly capable practitionei.may as a consequence be barred "permanently an,d irrebuttably"
fro:,;n pursuing his calling, without ever having an opportunity to
prove his pei;-sonal s~1s.1sa
One example of a statute amenable to "conclusive pre1mmption"
analysis would be t;he debt-ac;1.justing law upheld in Ferguson v.
Skrupa.189 The K~sas legislature had precluded laymen frn:i;n. the
business of debt-adjusting, ~though lawyer& were not &o p:reduded,111°
on the presumption that "fiuancially distress<;d debto1;~ require 'd~bt
adjustment' services and advice which no layma;n, . , . lioweve:r
honest, can possibly supply.''191 Pespite thfa conclusive presuwption
that no om: who had not been <!.dmitted to the bar was competent
tQ engage in debt-adjusting, the Supreme Court sustained the statute
against both due proces~ and equal protection challenges, :itating
that it had "retur;ned to the original constit11tional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic be}iefs for the
judgment of le~lative bodies, wh9 a:re electe;:d. to pass laws," 192 Yet,
under the Vlandis standard, this statutory presmllption see:p:is far
from "universally or necessarily true in fact," since :many experi~
enced debt adjustors surely have as m1,1ch competence to engage in
that business as the average lawyer. Moreover, "reasonable alternative means" are available to the state in the form of licensing and
regulation of the debt-adjusting trade, Sine~ c<:>mpetence tQ engage
in debt-adjusting could be m.easu,red by objective tests, it would
seem easier to determine than a college student's domiciliary intent.
In terms of the individual impact, the jfi.dividuals who were forced
to give up their livelihood by the Kansas smtute surely suffered
greater hardship than the Vlandis appellees, who paid higher tµition
rates but were able to remain in school and did receive some state
subsidy. As Justice Rehnquist stated in his Vlandis dissent: "The
Court's highly abstract and theoretical analysis of this practical
problem leads to a conclusion that is contrary to the teaching of
Ferguson . . • .''193
The conclusive presumption analysis can also be applied to in188. 412 U.S. at 462.
189. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
190, Act of June 30, 1961, ch. 190, § 1, [1961] Kansas Laws 378, repealed by Act of
April 23, 1969, ch. 180, § 21-4701, [1969l Kansas Laws 503,
191, Brief for Appellant Sanborn at ll,
192. 372 '(J.S, at 7/l0.
193. 412 U.S. at 468.
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come cut-offs for welfare eligibility. For example, at the time of
Murry a federal regulation precluded five-member households with
income over 440 dollars per month from receiving food stamps.104
It was thus conclusively pre~umed that such households had sufficient
income to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. Yet, a five-member
household with income of 450 dollars per month could claim that,
due to special dietary requirements, this presumption was not "necessarily true in fact." Under Vlandis and Murry, the household
would appear to have a constitutional right to a due process hearing
on its actual need.195 There might seem to be little additional administrative burden in making an exception to the strict income
cut-off for individual circumstances such as special dietary requirements. Yet, once exceptions to this "bright line" statute are permitted, it would be difficult to limit their scope. Eventually, it
would be necessary to consider the entire range of special individual
circumstances, until the actual food needs of each household were
determined. One obvious example would be the age, size, sex, and
other factors influencing the caloric intake of each child in the
household. There is certainly a difference between a "five-member
household" with one adult and four pre-school children and a
household with two adults and three teen-age boys. Yet, under the
food stamp program, both households are conclusively presumed to
have the same level of need if they have the same income.
Another example of the kind of statute susceptible of conclusive
presumption analysis is the traffic speed limit. The purpose behind
a speed limit is usually to help ensure safe driving; if a speed limit
is set at 25 miles per hour on a certain street, it is thus conclusively
presumed that driving above that speed is unsafe.196 The ticketed
driver will assuredly not be heard to argue that, while he was driving at 35 miles per hour, he<iwas driving safely under the prevailing
194. 37 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1972).
195. Indeed, a very similar example was used by the government in Murry in oppo•
sition to appellees' motion for a temporary restraining order in federal district court:
"There are a lot of people in the country, I think, who may or may not be needy, to
whom food stamp relief is not available • • • • Who is to say $400 is enough, as opposed
to $399 a month? That one dollar does not make the difference between being needy
or not. Congress has to make limits." Oral argument before Gesell, J., Hearing on
:Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, July 19, 1972, quoted in Brief for Appellees
at B-10.
196. 'That this example is not as far-fetched as it first appears is shown by the case
of O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762 (1929), in which an ordinance de•
dared that a rate of speed in excess of 25 miles per hour for a distance of one city
block should be considered proof of driving at a rate of speed that was not careful or
prudent. The Missouri supreme court struck down that ordinance under the conclusive
presumption doctrine and held that, while the legislature may provide that proof of a
certain character shall be prima facie evidence of a fact sought to be established, it cannot prescribe what shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. While the court asserted
that the ordinance "does not fix a speed limit," 323 l\fo. at 1179, 21 S.W.2d at 766, it
is difficult to perceive more than a semantic distinction.
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conditions. But this argument seems perfectly consisten~ with the
rationale of Vlandis and Murry, and, if that rationale were widely
applied, every speed limit in the United States would be unconstitutional. A "reasonable alternative" to speed limits is availableleaving the assessment of whether certain driving is unsafe to the
discretion of the traffic policeman. Another possibility is to make
speeding only prima facie evidence of unsafe driving and, therefore,
permit the driver to introduce evidence that he was driving safely.
Moreover, since a certain number of speeding convictions can
result in the suspension of one's driver's license, the individual impact is similar to that involved in the Bell case.
A final example from among the "literally thousands" of statutes
creating conclusive presumptions is section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.197 This section conclusively presumes that,
when a corporate director, officer or shareholder of over ten per cent
of the stock buys .and sells securities of his corporation within a
six-month period, he is trading on inside information. Thus, even
if a corporate "insider," as statutorily defined, can prove that he had
absolutely no access to inside information, he is still given no opportunity to rebut this presumption.198 Moreover, the impact of a violation on the individual can be very significant; as stated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton,199 "[t]he crushing liabilities which Sec. 16(b) may impose are apparent from this action
in which the judgment was for over $300,000; it should certainly
serve as a warning, and may prove a deterrent." 200 Reasonable alternative means are available to the government; the defendant could
simply be allowed at his trial to show his lack of access to inside
information.201 The burden of proving a negative may be heavy,
but it is not as heavy as completely foreclosing the opportunity to
present evidence.202 If it is too heavy, the burden could be placed
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (1970). This provision was upheld against a due process
challenge in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
198. See Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 90
(1966). But see Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(19'73), and Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (19'73) (defendant not liable under section 16(b)
where he did not have access to inside information; restricted to noncash, "unorthodox"
transactions, such as mergers), both discussed in Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing
Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REv. 592
(1974).
199. 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) •.
200. 187 F.2d at 52.
201. For a proposed change in section 16(b) to allow the defendant to present rebuttal evidence on the issue of possession of inside information, see Munter, supra
note 198, at 101.
202. Munter, supra note 198, at 94.
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on the government to p::,;ove access to inside infonnation; the govermnent must already prove actual access in actions for insider trading under rule IOb-5. 203 WhiJe it may be argued that section 16(b)
gives adequate waxning to corporate in!!iders, who can avoid. liability
under the section by waiting iiix. months between trades, a similar
opportunity to comply with the statute was availablt: to the plaintiffs in Vlandis; T.b.ey would .have peel\ classed as residents if they
had moved to Connecticut before applying for admission, While
a move that far in advance of th<:! school semester Jllay have been
financially burdensome, it may be more costly for a corporate insider
to hold securities for six month& in a falling market.
The four examples cited above 204 illustrate the fact that "conclusive presumptions" pervade the legal system, running the gamut
from occupational licensing and welfare eligibility to traffic laws
and securities regulation. None is likely to be "necessarily or universally true in fact," and i•reasonable alternative means" in the
Vlandis sense of an individual determination will almost always be
available to the state. Given the minimal degree of individual impact of the rigid classification and the large additional administrative
burden involved in a case~by,case determination in the Vlandis situation, it is difficult to see how the conclusive presumption doctrine
in its most recently enunciated form can be limited.
The doctrine has substantial difficulties that render it unsuitable
as a mode of constitutional adjudication. Since most statutes are "conclusive presumptions" and none is "universally true," the Supreme
Court's test provides no guidance as to when the doctrine is to
result in invalidation. The approach, in essence, merely consists in
the Court's conclusory declaration that the statute in question is
an unacceptable conclusive presumption.
If the doctrine is followed consistently, it would severely restrict
the ability of legislatures to draft statutes that could be effectively
administered.205 If the c;loctrine is not to be allowed to run roughshod
over all existing legislation, it should be limited to statutory schemes
dealing with important entitlements-Vlandis should be disregarded. It would be preferable. however, for the Court to abandon
its "war on irrebuttable presµmptions" 200 as theoretically un!lound
and practically unworkable.
203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1973). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 V,S. 97G (1968).
204. For additional examples, see LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4194-95 (Rehnquist, J., dis·
senting).
2Q5. See LaFleqr1 42 U.S.L,W. at 4l94 (R~nquist, J., dissenting).
206. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4194 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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EQUAL PROTECTION .ALTERNATIVE . '

By. using the equal protection clause to resolve the problem of
the overinclusive burdening classification, many of the difficulties
relating to the conclusive presumption doctrine can _be avoided.'
First, with regard to cases involving governmental benefits, the equal
protection clause is preferable, since there is no need to contend
with the threshold due process requirement of a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property.207 Second, since all equal protection ~nalysis is
"substantive" in nature, the equal protection approach avoids the
doctrinal confusion among the different functions, standards, and
judicial roles associated with substantive and procedural .due process. Third, a developed body of law is available to deal with cases
involving discriminatory classifications. Finally, equal protection
affords a ·more direct analysis of discri_minatory legislative· classifications, thus avoiding the problem of obfuscation that the conclusive
presumption doctrine entails.
The equal protection approach does, however, share two difficulties with the conclusive presumption doctrine. Both solutions involve substantive judicial intrusions into the public policy sphere,208
and both must allow some overinclusiveness or inequality in the
naµie of efficient administration. To minimize these difficulties,
courts should exercise restraint in reviewing legislative classifications
in the social and economic areas and, unless they are patently
arbitrary, invalidate them only when necessary to avoid needless
hardship. The following is a suggested standard for reviewing social
and economic classifications under the equal protection clause, reflecting three fundamental values--preservation of the legislature's
role in formulating public policy, avoidance of needless individual
hardship, and conservation of administrative resources: An overinclusive burdening classification violates eq?fal protection when a
more accurate individual determination would (1) avoid individual
hardship and (2) be possible with little or no additional administrative expense, even though there is a rational relationship between
· 207. This is true only with respect to. state legislation, since equal protection as
applied to the federal government is a component of due process and should therefore
entail all of the requirements of the due process clause. This may mean that the states
are subject.to different standards of equal protection than is the federal government.
"[S]ince Congress is not expressly limited by any equal protection clause, it is not subject to the same limitation directed against discrimination as is imposed on the states."
I'. KAUPER, supra note 142, at 690. See also Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. '848, 855
(D. Mass.), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4313 (U.S., March 4, 1974): "[T]he appropriateness of
subjecting federal legislation to equal protection analysis can only be determined on a
case-by-case basis." This results in the application of a double standard to state and
federal legislation faced with an equal protection challenge.
208. See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 100.
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the classification and the purpose of_ the legislation. This standard
would serve the purpose presently served by the conclusive presump•
tion doctrine, that is, it would act as a safety valve for avoiding
hardship in cases where there is a rational basis for the classification
but where no fundamental interest or suspect classification is involved. The suggested standard differs from the conclusive presumption approach in three important respects: (1) It is based on
the equal protection concept, rather than on due process; (2) it
limits judicial review to cases of individual hardship; and (3) it
requires a showing that the additional administrative burden would
be small.
If this standard were applied to Murry, the statutory provision
would be struck down. While it did have a rational basis, the tax.dependency provision worked needless hardship on a number ot
impoverished households. 209 And it could be eliminated with little
or no additional administrative burden.210 Likewise, in LaFleur the
deprivation of the teachers' source of livelihood, was hardship, and
there does not appear to be any substantial administrative problems
with permitting each pregnant teacher to determine, with her physician's assistance, her own date to begin maternity leave.
In Vlandis, however, the suggested standard would result in up•
holding Connecticut's statutory definition of residency, for there
was no showing of real individual hardship, 211 and the additional
administrative burden required by an individual determination is
likely to be significant.
Unlike the conclusive presumption doctrine, the suggested standard would not logically compel the invalidation of great numbers
of federal and state legislative classifications. Yet, it would fulfill the
need that led to the adoption of the conclusive presumption doctrine; it would reduce the rigidity of the present two-tiered standard
of equal protection review.
209. Incorrectly classifying appellees' impoverished households as nonneedy worked
personal hardship in the form of hunger and even severe malnutrition. Brief for Ap•
pellees at 17.
210. The food stamp program had pre-existing procedures for determining the
actual financial resources available to a household, so that any additional administra•
live burden imposed by the decision was de minimus. Id. at 71.
211. The personal hardship on appellees amounted to only a 450-dollars-per-semester
tuition differential. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in dissent, there was no allega•
tion by either plaintiff "that the higher _out-of-state tuition charge does, will, or even
may deprive her of the opportunity to attend the University of Connecticut," 412 U.S.
at 461 n.•.

